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NOTES
CATCHING UP TO A NEW NORMAL: THE
EFFECTS OF SHIFTING INDUSTRY STANDARDS
ON CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
Karen Chen*
During the COVID-19 pandemic, industries around the world were forced
to adapt to a new way of life dictated by rising public health concerns. The
pandemic’s rapid spread left parties struggling to determine whether
contractual performance would be excused or reinterpreted. Issues of
prevailing industry standards arose and brought into question the point at
which parties and courts should define these standards. While some parties
argued that industry standards at the time of contract formation are
determinative of performance, others claimed that their agreement
referenced industry standards that had changed and that, therefore, their
performance obligations had changed as well.
By looking at contract disputes brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic,
this Note examines potential issues of contract interpretation that arise when
industry standards referenced by the parties change within the life of a
contract. This Note addresses these issues in the context of different types of
contracts and examines the use of specific language that references industry
standards in the agreements. Ultimately, this Note proposes a general
application of an ex ante interpretation of industry standards that would
avoid issues of uncertainty even beyond the context of the COVID-19
pandemic.
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INTRODUCTION
In July 2019, Marvel Studios (“Marvel”) officially announced the highly
anticipated fourth phase of the Marvel Cinematic Universe, including Black
Widow, which is the first film of Phase 4 and features Scarlett Johansson
reprising her role as the titular character.1 Discussions of a potential
standalone film for Johansson’s character had been ongoing since 2014,2 and

1. See SDCC 2019: All of the Marvel Studios News Coming Out of Hall H at San Diego
Comic-Con, MARVEL (July 21, 2019), https://www.marvel.com/articles/movies/sdcc-2019all-of-the-marvel-studios-news-coming-out-of-hall-h-at-san-diego-comic-con
[https://perma.cc/EHC7-6TQ7].
2. See Anthony Couto, Feige: Black Widow’s Past to Be Explored in Avengers 2 and
Possible Solo Film, IGN (Feb. 12, 2014, 9:06 PM), https://www.ign.com/articles/2014/02/13/
feige-black-widows-past-to-be-explored-in-avengers-2-and-possible-solo-film
[https://perma.cc/GHJ7-VDCY].
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the release date for the film was initially set for May 1, 2020.3 Unfortunately,
world events dictated a much different 2020 than was expected.
On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared the novel
coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak a global pandemic.4 The pandemic
drastically affected all aspects of everyday life and had a significant impact
on the way various industries, including the entertainment industry, were able
to operate.5 Social distancing requirements led to government-issued
stay-at-home orders.6 Businesses closed their doors and implemented remote
work where possible.7 Schools sent students home and implemented virtual
learning.8 Some industries were even forced to shut down entirely.9
Consequently, contract enforcement, performance, and interpretation had to
adjust to this new way of life.10
Industries rushed to adapt to the new world in the pandemic to maintain
their businesses.11 For example, as theaters closed, production studios were
forced to push back their 2020 film release dates for months at a time.12 The
Walt Disney Company (“Disney”) initially delayed the May 2020 release of
Black Widow to November 6, 2020, but the release was pushed back even

3. See SDCC 2019: All of the Marvel Studios News Coming Out of Hall H at San Diego
Comic-Con, supra note 1.
4. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Opening Remarks at
Media Briefing on COVID-19 (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/director-general/
speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19--11-march-2020 [https://perma.cc/3Z2D-GRMZ]; see Covid-19 Pandemic Timeline Fast
Facts, CNN (Mar. 30, 2022, 9:15 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/09/health/covid-19pandemic-timeline-fast-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/W5AM-YN27].
5. See DELOITTE CTR. FOR TECH., MEDIA & TELECOMMS., COVID-19 OUTLOOK FOR THE
US MEDIA AND ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 4 (2020), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/
technology-media-and-telecommunications/articles/covid-19-outlook-on-mediaindustry.html [https://perma.cc/9YSS-CPJJ]; see also infra Part II.A.1.a.
6. See Sarah Mervosh et al., See Which States and Cities Have Told Residents to Stay at
Home, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/
coronavirus-stay-at-home-order.html [https://perma.cc/C9SS-8BBB].
7. See Kathryn Vasel, The Pandemic Forced a Massive Remote-Work Experiment. Now
Comes the Hard Part, CNN (Mar. 11, 2021, 8:36 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/09/
success/remote-work-covid-pandemic-one-year-later/index.html
[https://perma.cc/ANL75Z2H]; see also Ruth Simon, Covid-19’s Toll on U.S. Business?: 200,000 Extra Closures in
Pandemic’s First Year, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16, 2021, 9:43 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/covid-19s-toll-on-u-s-business-200-000-extra-closures-in-pandemics-first-year11618580619 [https://perma.cc/K5K3-C37F].
8. See Marisa Porges, Schools Are Closing for Coronavirus. Now What?, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/parenting/coronavirus-schoolslessons.html [https://perma.cc/82A8-9UGY].
9. See Simon, supra note 7.
10. See generally Andrew A. Schwartz, Contracts and COVID-19, 73 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 48 (2020).
11. See generally Kevin Sneader & Bob Sternfels, From Surviving to Thriving:
Reimagining the Post-COVID-19 Return, MCKINSEY & CO. (May 1, 2020),
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/from-surviving-to-thrivingreimagining-the-post-covid-19-return [https://perma.cc/CX6C-DTGC].
12. See Here Are All the Movies Delayed Because of the Coronavirus—with Some New
Release Dates, VULTURE (Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.vulture.com/2021/04/here-are-all-themovies-and-tv-shows-affected-by-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/33MH-4439].
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further to May 7, 2021.13 Disney ultimately settled on a release date of
July 9, 2021, announcing that the film would be simultaneously released in
theaters and on the studio’s streaming service, Disney+, similar to the
releases of the films Soul, Raya and the Last Dragon, and Mulan.14 Black
Widow enjoyed a relatively successful release, grossing $181.5 million in the
United States and $371 million worldwide15 and ending the year as the
fourth-highest-grossing domestic film of 2021.16
However, on July 29, 2021, Scarlett Johansson sued Disney over its
decision to move forward with the simultaneous release.17 Johansson’s
lawsuit was not the only contract dispute caused by COVID-19. The
pandemic’s rapid spread significantly impacted a variety of long-term
contracts, leaving many businesses struggling to determine whether
contractual performance would be excused or reinterpreted in light of the
pandemic.18 The new industry standards led to a series of contractual
disputes over whether parties’ contracts were fully performed.19 Some argue
that the industry standards and customs at the time of a contract’s formation
should determine how that contract should be interpreted and ultimately
enforced, regardless of how those standards have changed and what they may
be at the time of performance.20
While many parties to contracts have pointed to the doctrines of
impossibility, impracticability, or frustration of purpose and to force majeure
clauses to excuse themselves from contract performance during the
COVID-19 pandemic, this Note specifically considers cases in which parties
do not seek to be excused from performance. Rather, in these cases, a party
claims that its performance obligations reference an industry standard that

13. See Michael Kennedy, Everything We Know About Black Widow, SCREEN RANT
(Apr. 13, 2021), https://screenrant.com/black-widow-movie-updates-release-date-story/
[https://perma.cc/9P2N-PNA8]; Ryan Lattanzio, Disney Moves “Black Widow” to July,
Releasing in Movie Theaters and Disney+ Streaming, INDIEWIRE (Mar. 23, 2021, 2:33 PM),
https://www.indiewire.com/2021/03/black-widow-release-july-streaming-disney-plus1234610752/ [https://perma.cc/K85J-ASXC].
14. See Lattanzio, supra note 13.
15. 2021 Worldwide Box Office, BOX OFF. MOJO, https://www.boxofficemojo.com/
year/world/2021/ [https://perma.cc/N3ZB-VFRU] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022).
16. Domestic Box Office for 2021, BOX OFF. MOJO, https://www.boxofficemojo.com/
year/2021/?ref_=bo_yl_table_2 [https://perma.cc/ML6P-JX3Z] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022).
17. See Brooks Barnes & Nicole Sperling, Scarlett Johansson Sues Disney over ‘Black
Widow’ Release, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/29/
business/media/scarlett-johansson-black-widow-disney-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/7U34EDYH]; see also infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text.
18. See Yvette Ostolaza et al., What Spanish Flu-Era Contract Fights Tell Us About
Pandemics and Contractual Performance, AM. LAW., Apr. 1, 2020.
19. See, e.g., Joe Flint & Erich Schwartzel, Scarlett Johansson Sues Disney over ‘Black
Widow’ Streaming Release, WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2021, 5:57 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/scarlett-johansson-sues-disney-over-black-widow-streaming-release-11627579278
[https://perma.cc/H5C2-BUVQ]; In re Boston Univ. COVID-19 Refund Litig., 511 F. Supp.
3d 20 (D. Mass. 2021); In re Columbia Tuition Refund Action v. Pace Univ., 523 F. Supp. 3d
414 (S.D.N.Y. 2021); Barkhordar v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 544 F. Supp. 3d
203 (D. Mass. 2021).
20. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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has changed and that, based on the ex post industry standard, its obligations
have been satisfied.21
How should a court interpret contract language that relies on industry
standards when those standards have changed since contract formation due
to a global disruption as significant as a worldwide pandemic? Even if parties
have a mutual understanding of the industry standard at the time of contract
formation, do they have an affirmative obligation to perform to the point of
meeting an ex ante understanding of an industry custom even after the
standard has shifted? How may this inquiry turn on whether the parties
intended the standard to adjust or whether the language of the contract
actually references or only implies an industry standard?
This Note addresses these questions and seeks to understand how changing
standards may be applied to contract interpretation in an environment still
learning to adjust to the current pandemic world. While courts and legal
scholars have taken up issues of total relief and ways in which parties may
look to excuse contract performance based on the pandemic,22 this Note
focuses on situations in which the parties can—and do—perform the contract
fully and later dispute the performance of specific terms of the agreement.
Part I outlines the relevant principles of contract interpretation. This part
also describes how parties and courts consider industry standards in
situations of claimed ambiguity and addresses how extrinsic evidence of
industry standards can and has influenced how courts have interpreted
contracts.
Part II examines the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on industry
standards in cases in which plaintiffs claimed that contracts formed before
the pandemic were breached. It addresses and compares how industry
standards may be applied to interpret contract language in bargained-for
contracts, such as those in the entertainment industry, and contracts of
adhesion, such as those in education. This part addresses arguments that
industry standards at the time of formation are binding on the interpretation
of these contracts, analyzes how these industries have changed, and considers
whether the customs at the time of performance should determine how courts
interpret the contract language.
Part III recommends that contract interpretation of industry standards
generally default to the standards at the time of formation. This part
discusses the preexisting principles of judicial contract interpretation
outlined in Part I and how the principles are applied in light of these new
circumstances. It also considers potential issues related to interpreting a
contract term in a case in which parties dispute the relevant time period for
the industry standard. Finally, this part addresses public policy issues related
to the enforcement of industry standards that have shifted and considers
contracts beyond those affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. It examines
future implications of the interpretation of industry standards. It also

21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
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examines the way contract law broadly may adjust to other potential, similar
situations, whether they are other events that cause worldwide disruption or
unexpected changes in light of rapid acceleration within an industry.
I. A BRIEF REVIEW OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
While particular contract issues brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic
are largely novel and unaddressed, general issues of contract interpretation
based on industry standards have been widely confronted by courts and legal
scholars.23 This part reviews fundamental rules of contract interpretation, as
well as the way courts have applied these rules in understanding industry
standards in contracts. It then looks to how these rules and other doctrines
have been applied to disputed interpretations of contracts. This Note further
reviews doctrines of contract law that excuse contractual obligations
altogether.
A. Contract Interpretation: How Courts Apply Industry Standards
The goal of contract interpretation is to find the solution to a contracting
problem that best reflects the intent of the parties in their agreement.24 Over
time, courts and scholars have developed and recognized rules of contract
interpretation that are intended to guide courts and litigants when
determining the mutual intent of the contracting parties.25 The role of
interpretation is to identify the meaning of a legal actor’s words or actions,
while the rules of interpretation outline how to discern the meaning of what
parties say and do.26 While these rules are not definitive, they are commonly
used as tools to achieve the goal of determining parties’ intent.27
1. Interpreting the Written Word
Contract interpretation generally begins with the plain language of the
contract.28 When possible, a court will first employ a “plain meaning”
analysis to resolve any questions of interpretation.29 Where the language
employed in a contract is unambiguous, courts must interpret the words of
the contract based on their common and generally accepted meanings, unless
the contract specifies particular meanings.30 However, if the parties dispute
23. See infra Part I.A.
24. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 568–69 (2003); see also Gregory Klass, Contracts, Constitutions,
and Getting the Interpretation-Construction Distinction Right, 18 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 13,
17 (2020).
25. See Keith A. Rowley, Contract Construction and Interpretation: From the “Four
Corners” to Parol Evidence (and Everything in Between), 69 MISS. L.J. 73, 82–83 (1999).
26. See Klass, supra note 24, at 16.
27. See Patrick S. Ottinger, Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 60 LA. L. REV. 765,
772 (2000).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 202(3)(a) (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“Where language
has a generally prevailing meaning, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning.”).
29. See Aleman Food Servs., Inc. v. United States, 994 F.2d 819, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
30. Storino, Ramello & Durkin v. Rackow, 45 N.E.3d 307, 313 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
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the meaning of the contract’s language, the court must determine what the
parties meant and intended.31 In construing the terms of a contract, the
parties’ intent must be gathered from the contract as a whole to glean the
meaning of terms within the document’s context.32
Interpreting a contract often includes examining the words within the “four
corners” of the contract to determine the parties’ intent.33 The four corners
doctrine calls for construction through the application of commonly
understood English definitions and usages based on rules of grammar,
syntax, and other canons of construction.34 This examination limits the
amount of evidence a court may consider in determining whether the contract
language is clear and unambiguous.35 Courts generally follow the four
corners rule when determining contract ambiguity, sometimes in the form of
the parol evidence rule.36 The parol evidence rule prohibits parties from
introducing extrinsic evidence intended to prove contractual terms that either
contradict or add to the final expression of the written agreement.37
While many courts look to these rules of interpretation, common-law
exceptions to the four corners doctrine and parol evidence rule exist,38 and
some courts apply a more contextual approach39 and allow all credible
evidence regarding parties’ intention to determine whether the language of
the contract is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation maintained by the
party claiming ambiguity.40 Ultimately, courts will generally look to all

31. See 11 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 31:1 (4th ed. 1990).
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 202(2) (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“A writing is
interpreted as a whole, and all writings that are part of the same transaction are interpreted
together.”).
33. See O’Brien v. Miller, 168 U.S. 287, 297 (1897) (“The elementary canon of
interpretation is, not that particular words may be isolatedly considered, but that the whole
contract must be brought into view and interpreted with reference to the nature of the
obligations between the parties, and the intention which they have manifested in forming
them.”); see also Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d 349, 352–53 (Miss. 1990)
(“‘[P]articular words . . . should not control[; rather,] the entire instrument should be
examined.’ . . . This so-called ‘four corners’ doctrine calls for construction through
application of ‘correct English definition and language usage.’ . . . If examination solely of
the language within the instrument’s four corners does not yield a clear understanding of the
parties’ intent, the court will generally proceed to another tier . . . .” (first and third alteration
in original) (citations omitted) (first citing Mounger v. Pittman, 108 So. 2d 565, 567 (Miss.
1959); and then quoting Thornhill v. Sys. Fuel. Inc., 523 So. 2d 983, 1007 (Miss. 1988)
(Robertson, J., concurring in denial of petition for reh’g))).
34. See Rowley, supra note 25, at 88.
35. Id. at 89.
36. See Joshua M. Silverstein, Contract Interpretation and the Parol Evidence Rule:
Toward Conceptual Clarification, 24 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 92 n.10 (2020) (citing STEVEN J.
BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 126 (2009)).
37. See id. at 102.
38. See Rowley, supra note 25, at 268–303; see also Mark K. Glasser & Keith A. Rowley,
On Parol: The Construction and Interpretation of Written Agreements and the Role of
Extrinsic Evidence in Contract Litigation, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 657, 718–42 (1997).
39. See Silverstein, supra note 36, at 92 n.10 (“Nine states . . . have adopted a
contextualist or ‘antiformalist’ interpretive regime.”).
40. See id.
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applicable rules of interpretation to reach a reasonable interpretation of the
disputed contract language.
2. Ambiguity: Industry Custom and Practice, Trade Usage, and Industry
Standards
In contract interpretation, a court generally must look at whether the
provisions at issue are reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation
to determine whether the provisions are ambiguous.41 However, the
prevailing view among courts and scholars is that a court is not required to
find ambiguity before it may apply rules of interpretation to determine the
meaning and consequence of the parties’ written agreement.42 Rather, a court
should apply the rules along with all relevant evidence to ascertain the
existence of any ambiguity and resolve it once identified.43 In interpreting a
specific contractual term, courts generally consider the meaning attributed to
that term in the industry.44
Where particular terms have an industry-specific meaning, courts may
apply the concept of trade usage.45 A trade usage is “any practice or method
of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade
as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the
transaction in question.”46 Trade usage is generally admissible without a
showing that the contract language is ambiguous.47 However, trade usage is
only relevant if both parties to the contract are involved in the same trade.48
Where trade usage is not applicable, courts have historically determined
that industry standards can be applied to contracts in cases where both parties
41. See Eagle Indus., Inc. v. DeVilbiss Health Care, Inc., 702 A.2d 1228, 1232 (Del.
1997); see also Natt v. White Sands Condo., 95 A.D.3d 848, 849 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
(“Contract language is ambiguous when it is ‘reasonably susceptible of more than one
interpretation’ and there is nothing to indicate which meaning is intended, or where there is
contradictory or necessarily inconsistent language in different portions of the instrument.’”
(citations omitted) (first citing Chimart Assocs. v. Paul, 489 N.E.2d 231, 233 (N.Y. 1986);
and then citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Castro, 341 F.2d 882, 884 (1st Cir. 1965))).
42. See Rowley, supra note 25, at 82–83.
43. See id. at 83.
44. See Pers. Preference Video, Inc. v. Home Box Off., Inc., 986 F.2d 110, 114 (5th Cir.
1993); see also Seiden Assocs., Inc. v. ANC Holdings, Inc., 959 F.2d 425, 428 (2d Cir. 1992)
(noting that a contract is ambiguous if it is “capable of more than one meaning when viewed
objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined the context of the entire
integrated agreement and who is cognizant of the customs, practices, usages and terminology
as generally understood in the particular trade or business”).
45. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 63 (2015).
46. U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
47. See Bernstein, supra note 45, at 72 (“[The Official Comments] reject the strict English
and common law standards for establishing the existence of a custom, create a presumption
that commercially accepted usages are reasonable, make clear that usages are admissible
without a showing that the contract language is ambiguous, and make the question of whether
an extant usage has been incorporated a question for the trier of fact.” (footnote omitted)); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 222 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“There is no
requirement that an agreement be ambiguous before evidence of a usage of trade can be
shown . . . .”).
48. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-303(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
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to the contract are involved in that industry and have reason to know of those
standards.49 Generally, if there is a custom in an industry, courts deem
parties engaged in that industry to have contracted in reference to that
practice unless the contrary appears from the contract’s other terms.50 A
party engaged in the business is bound to the prevailing industry custom.51
Evidence of custom and practice in an industry is generally admissible to
define an undefined term where a court has found ambiguity.52
3. Parties’ Intent to Be Bound by Industry Standards
When parties argue that an ambiguous contract term should be understood
in the context of an industry standard, a presumption that the parties intended
to incorporate that standard may exist.53 The party offering evidence of
industry custom must show either that the other party was actually aware of
the usage or that the existence of such usage is “so notorious that a person of
ordinary prudence in the exercise of reasonable care would be aware of it.”54
Courts are to construe commercial contracts in accordance with the industry
standards to which the contract relates.55 Courts may look to extrinsic
evidence—including the course of dealing between the parties or the usage
of trade56 or the course of performance57—which, unlike in other primary
rules of construction, affirmatively invites the trial court to consider extrinsic
proof even when there is no claim of ambiguity.58
In using industry standards to interpret contract language, courts hold that
evidence of these standards is generally admissible to define an undefined
term.59 However, as with other rules of interpretation, extrinsic evidence
49. See Lambourne v. Manchester Country Props., 374 A.2d 122, 123 (Vt. 1977) (quoting
Blin v. Mayo & Follett, 10 Vt. 56, 61 (1838)).
50. See Midwest Television, Inc. v. Scott, Lancaster, Mills & Atha, Inc., 252 Cal. Rptr.
573, 579 (App. Ct. 1988).
51. Id.
52. See Int’l Multifoods Corp. v. Com. Union Ins. Co., 309 F.3d 76, 87 n.4 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“[T]he line between a contract that is so clear as a matter of ordinary meaning that evidence
of industry practice ultimately cannot alter the apparent plain meaning of the language and a
contract where industry practice informs interpretation may prove difficult to draw. But that
is not to say that evidence of custom and usage is irrelevant to the assessment of whether
ambiguity exists.”).
53. Jobim v. Songs of Universal, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 407, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
54. Reuters Ltd. v. Dow Jones Telerate, Inc., 231 A.D.2d 337, 343 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
55. See Glasser & Rowley, supra note 38, at 666–67.
56. “Usage of trade” is “any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of
observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed
with respect to the transaction in question.” U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L.
COMM’N 2021).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 202(5) (AM. L. INST. 1981).
58. See Glasser & Rowley, supra note 38, at 668; see also KMI Cont’l Offshore Prod. Co.
v. ACF Petroleum Co., 746 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. App. 1987) (“[T]he circumstances to be
considered are not the parties’ statements of what they intended the contract to mean, but
circumstances known to the parties at the time they entered into the contract, such as what the
industry considered to be the norm or reasonable and prudent.”).
59. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also Par-Co Drilling, Inc. v. Franks
Petroleum Inc., 360 So. 2d 642, 644 (La. Ct. App. 1927) (“It is well settled that custom of the
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about industry standards is not conclusory.60 Courts note that private
industry standards are typically viewed as advisory, as they lack the force of
law.61 Therefore, the admission of extrinsic evidence to show an established
industry standard indicates the recognition of the term within the industry.62
B. Justifying Nonperformance During the COVID-19 Pandemic
In addition to causing general turmoil, the COVID-19 pandemic has also
created significant issues in contractual relationships by preventing parties
from fulfilling pre-pandemic contracts.63 When a party claims that the other
has breached a pre-contract standard, the breaching party can proceed in a
few ways. This Note addresses how contracts should be interpreted when the
breaching party in a breach-of-contract claim—rather than claiming a change
in circumstance that excuses the party from performance and moving forward
with the contractual obligations—claims that the meaning of the contractual
obligations has undergone a change in industry standard to which the party
has conformed. In general, the party that has not fulfilled the terms of the
contract is liable for breach of contract unless that party provides justification
for circumstances that the party claims are a sufficient basis for exemption
from the contract terms.64 Contract disputes based on noncompliance with
the contract terms due to the pandemic often point to doctrines of
impossibility, impracticability, or frustration of purpose or to force majeure
clauses.65
Under the principle of impossibility or impracticability, a party may be
excused from performance when an unanticipated event that could not have
been foreseen makes performance impossible or impracticable.66 Frustration
of purpose also may excuse performance and applies when a change in
circumstances after a contract was entered into makes one party’s
performance worthless to the other, frustrating the purpose of the contract.67
place and the usual and customary manner of fulfilling like contracts is persuasive in
determining the intention of the parties under a contract not specific in its wording.”).
60. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
61. See Volt Servs. Grp. v. Adecco Emp. Servs., Inc., 35 P.3d 329, 336 (Or. Ct. App.
2001).
62. See id.
63. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 48.
64. See Cater v. Barker, 617 S.E.2d 113, 117 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 625 S.E.2d 778
(2006) (“Non-performance of a valid contract is a breach thereof . . . unless the person
charged . . . shows some valid reason which may excuse the non-performance.” (alterations in
original) (quoting Blount-Midyette v. Aeroglide Corp., 119 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1961))).
65. See Inna Vorotyntseva et al., Comparative Legal Research on Contract Law Changes
Under COVID-19 Pandemic: England, United States, Asia and Ukraine, 10 IUS HUMANI L.J.
123, 135 (2021).
66. Dermott v. Jones, 69 U.S. 1, 7 (1865) (“[I]f a party by his contract charge himself with
an obligation possible to be performed, he must make it good, unless its performance is
rendered impossible by the act of God . . . .”); Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458,
460 (Cal. 1916) (“A thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it is not practicable; and
a thing is impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost.”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 261 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
67. See Chase Precast Corp. v. John J. Paonessa Corp., 566 N.E.2d 603, 605–06 (Mass.
1991); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 265 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
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Many contracts also include force majeure clauses, which similarly excuse
a party’s nonperformance under a contract when extraordinary events, such
as an “act of god,” prevent a party from fulfilling its contractual obligations.68
The parties are allowed to define exactly what circumstances constitute force
majeure and what the consequences of any event of force majeure would be
in the contract.69 In considering the applicability of force majeure, courts
look to several factors: (1) whether the event qualifies as force majeure as
defined by the contract, (2) whether the risk of nonperformance was
foreseeable and able to be mitigated, and (3) whether performance is truly
impossible.70
As the pandemic rendered many parties unable to satisfy their contractual
obligations, defendants to breach-of-contract cases increasingly relied on
these doctrines to attempt to excuse their nonperformance of contractual
obligations.71 Courts have ruled on the applicability of force majeure clauses
and whether COVID-19 would constitute a defined event under the contracts
in question.72 Additionally, in the wake of the pandemic, legal scholars have
written extensively on situations in which parties have been unable to
perform the contract through the lenses of impossibility, impracticability,
frustration of purpose, or force majeure clauses.73
68. LORD, supra note 31; see also Aukema v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 839 F. Supp.
2d 555, 560 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. 2012).
69. See, e.g., In re Cablevision Consumer Litig., 864 F. Supp. 2d 258, 264 (E.D.N.Y.
2012); Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that
force majeure defense is narrow and only excuses nonperformance “if the force majeure clause
specifically includes the event that actually prevents a party’s performance”); LORD, supra
note 31 (“What types of events constitute force majeure depend on the specific language
included in the clause itself.”).
70. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also UPDATE: Force Majeure Under
the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic, PAUL WEISS (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3979438/16mar20-update-force-majeure.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D5ZB-9RBD].
71. See, e.g., 1600 Walnut Corp. v. Cole Haan Co. Store, 530 F. Supp. 3d 555, 558 (E.D.
Pa. 2021) (finding that the COVID-19 pandemic was covered in force majeure clause of
commercial lease); JN Contemp. Art LLC v. Phillips Auctioneers LLC, 507 F. Supp. 3d 490,
501 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“[T]he pandemic and the regulations that accompanied it fall squarely
under the ambit of Paragraph 12(a)’s force majeure clause.”). But c.f. In re CEC Ent., Inc.,
625 B.R. 344 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020) (finding that force majeure clauses of leases did not
allow debtor-operator of family entertainment and dining venues to withhold or abate rent
during pandemic).
72. See, e.g., Rudolph v. United Air Holdings, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 3d 438 (N.D. Ill. 2021)
(holding that COVID-19 pandemic did not qualify as force majeure pursuant to airline’s
conditions-of-carriage agreement); In re Cinemex USA Real Est. Holdings, Inc., 627 B.R. 693
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2021) (holding that force majeure clause in debtor’s commercial leases
relieved debtor of obligation to pay rent).
73. See, e.g., Laura Gates, Force Majeure, Vis Major, Impossibility, and Impracticability
Under Ohio Law Before and After COVID-19, 90 U. CIN. L. REV. 283 (2021); S. Esra Kiraz
& Esra Yildiz Ustun, COVID-19 and Force Majeure Clauses: An Examination of Arbitral
Tribunal’s Awards, 25 UNIF. L. REV. 437 (2020); Schwartz, supra note 10; Amy Sparrow
Phelps, Contract Fixer Upper: Addressing the Inadequacy of the Force Majeure Doctrine in
Providing Relief for Nonperformance in the Wake of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 66 VILL. L.
REV. 647 (2021); David A. Shargel et al., Revisiting Force Majeure and Other Contractual
Considerations
Amid
COVID-19,
NAT’L
L.
REV.
(Nov.
6,
2020),
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However, the discussion has primarily centered on ways in which parties
attempt to excuse their contractual obligations altogether, rather than on ways
in which parties—whose contractual obligations have been altered by the
pandemic and who are still able to perform the contract fully—may argue
against breach-of-contract claims based on pre-pandemic understandings of
a contract term.
II. CONTRACT PERFORMANCE DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
When the COVID-19 pandemic shut down businesses and forced
industries to rapidly accommodate “the new normal,”74 parties found reasons
to question contracts that were formed pre-pandemic but performed during
the pandemic.75 Where parties performed their contractual obligations, some
questioned which interpretation of contract language should be enforced—
particularly in cases in which parties claimed that a term was intended to be
understood by the industry standard.76 Industries always undergo changes,
such as technological advancements, as they evolve and adapt to new
realities, but the pandemic forced industries to make major shifts in an
instant, without the usual time for gradual evolution and adjustments.77
This raises the question of what the relevant time frame should be when
terms are interpreted according to industry standards, especially if those
industry standards were forced to change dramatically between the formation
of a contract and the time of performance. When it is possible to perform the
contract obligations, does an affirmative obligation to perform according to
the ex ante industry standard exist?
Based on the history of contract interpretation and existing precedent, it
seems likely that courts would uphold an ex ante understanding of an industry
standard when enforcing a term based on that standard.78 However, the
COVID-19 pandemic has raised an issue that courts have not previously
encountered: what happens when an industry jumps significantly from one
standard to another within the life of a contract? In light of this new situation,

https://www.natlawreview.com/article/revisiting-force-majeure-and-other-contractualconsiderations-amid-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/ALQ4-DYVL].
74. This now widely used term describes the different environment and day-to-day
lifestyle imposed by the early stages of the pandemic. See, e.g., Jeff Clyde G. Corpuz,
Adapting to the Culture of a ‘New Normal’: An Emerging Response to COVID-19, 43 J. PUB.
HEALTH e344, e344 (2021) (“The term ‘new normal’ first appeared during the 2008 financial
crisis to refer to the dramatic economic, cultural and social transformations that caused
precariousness and social unrest, impacting collective perceptions and individual lifestyles.
This term has been used again during the COVID19 pandemic to point out how it has
transformed essential aspects of human life.”).
75. See infra Parts II.A–B.
76. See infra Parts II.A–B.
77. See generally David C. Howe et al., Paradigm Shifts Caused by the COVID-19
Pandemic, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, Oct.–Nov. 2021.
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 202 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“In
interpreting the words and conduct of the parties to a contract, a court seeks to put itself in the
position they occupied at the time the contract was made.”).
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courts may need to approach in a new way interpretation that is based on
industry standards to address the problem at hand.79
A. Differing Levels of Contract Negotiation
There are several types of contracts that parties may enter into. This Note
looks specifically at bargained-for contracts and contracts of adhesion. In
bargained-for contracts, the parties generally negotiate the terms of the
contract and come to a mutually accepted agreement under which both parties
provide something of value that induces each party to exchange mutual
performances.80 Conversely, contracts of adhesion are generally drafted by
one party (typically the party with stronger bargaining power) and signed by
another party that generally has no opportunity to negotiate the terms of the
contract.81 The ways in which these different types of contracts are formed
and the bargaining power of the respective parties pose unique issues in
determinations of contract interpretation.82 This section addresses how and
why the interpretation of industry standards may vary based on the type of
contract entered into and gives examples of how parties have sought to
interpret contractual performance in their respective agreements.
1. Bargained-For Contracts
This section describes bargained-for contracts in the context of the
entertainment industry. Many contracts in the industry are heavily negotiated
and often result in long-term relationships between the parties. Part II.A.1.a
describes the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the entertainment
industry and how the modifications brought on by the pandemic have
changed the industry’s landscape. This section addresses these shifts and the
possibility that they may have long-term implications on the entire industry.
It then takes a closer look at a recent contract dispute between Scarlett
Johansson and Disney. Johansson claimed that the contract term “wide
theatrical release” was an industry-standard term that implied exclusive
theatrical release and that Disney’s choice to simultaneously release Black
Widow in theaters and on Disney+ was therefore a breach of their
agreement.83
Part II.A.1.b examines bargained-for contracts more broadly. It considers
potential reasons—such as similar bargaining power and levels of
negotiation—why parties in long-term bargained-for agreements could claim
that the contract allows for changing industry standards.

79. See infra Parts II.A–B.
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 3 (AM. L. INST. 1981); see also id. § 71
(outlining the requirements of consideration).
81. See Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
82. See supra Part II.A.
83. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
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a. Entertainment: An Industry Transformed (Possibly) for Good?
The COVID-19 pandemic brought about a massive disruption to the
entertainment industry.84 Most theaters, concert halls, and cinemas were
forced to close, and television and film production came to a halt for
months.85 Changes to the industry, including the shift of the initial showing
of movies from theaters to streaming services, that were expected to play out
over multiple years happened over the course of a few months.86
As millions were forced by government stay-at-home orders to quarantine,
viewers turned to at-home entertainment, resulting in the emergence of new
streaming video services.87 While the industry was already trending toward
streaming services, many agree that the pandemic accelerated the pace of the
trend.88 Warner Bros. Pictures released all of its 2021 feature films
simultaneously on the streaming service HBO Max,89 while Disney opted for
simultaneous streaming and theatrical releases for three of its 2021 films.90
However, the studios’ decisions to move to streaming services to debut their
feature films have been criticized by some prominent voices in the industry91
and has even led to litigation that claims that the simultaneous release
constituted a breach of contract.92

84. See Ryan Faughnder et al., Shaken Studios. Empty Theaters. What Hollywood Lost
During the Pandemic, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
entertainment-arts/business/story/2020-12-09/everything-hollywood-lost-during-thepandemic [https://perma.cc/JA68-JQ9E] (“The abrupt closure of nearly all of the nation’s
5,477 cinemas was probably the most visible sign of the industry’s disruption from
COVID-19—one that industry veterans and filmgoers worry will do permanent damage.”).
85. See Tia Richards, Predicting the Future of the Entertainment Industry After COVID,
USC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2021), https://news.usc.edu/183870/future-of-entertainment-aftercovid-movies-tv-streaming-usc-experts/ [https://perma.cc/D3VU-H9DJ].
86. See Faughnder, supra note 84.
87. See Brad Adgate, The Impact COVID-19 Had on the Entertainment Industry in 2020,
FORBES (Apr. 13, 2021, 11:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bradadgate/2021/04/13/
the-impact-covid-19-had-on-the-entertainment-industry-in-2020/ [https://perma.cc/W7PFS2FL].
88. See, e.g., id. (reporting that many industry analysts agreed that the pandemic sped up
the adoption of streaming services).
89. Julia Alexander, Warner Bros. Will Release All of Its New 2021 Movies
Simultaneously on HBO Max, THE VERGE (Dec. 3, 2020, 1:30 PM), https://
www.theverge.com/2020/12/3/22150605/hbo-max-warner-bros-movies-2021-simultaneousrelease-matrix-godzilla-suicide-squad-space-jam [https://perma.cc/9YYV-7VF7].
90. See Rebecca Rubin, ‘Black Widow,’ ‘Cruella’ to Debut on Disney Plus and in
Theaters as Disney Shifts Dates for Seven Films, VARIETY (Mar. 23, 2021, 11:30 AM),
https://variety.com/2021/film/news/disney-postpones-black-widow-shang-chi-1234935874/
[https://perma.cc/VRK9-LYWM]; see also Erich Schwartzel, “Jungle Cruise” Debut Is
Latest Example of Covid-19, Co-Release Challenges, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2021, 1:34 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/jungle-cruise-tops-a-middling-weekend-box-office11627839281 [https://perma.cc/UV6C-TDPA].
91. See, e.g., Kim Masters, Christopher Nolan Rips HBO Max as “Worst Streaming
Service,” Denounces Warner Bros.’ Plan, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 7, 2020, 4:36 PM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/christopher-nolan-rips-hbomax-as-worst-streaming-service-denounces-warner-bros-plan-4101408/
[https://perma.cc/VJN7-UKH3].
92. See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
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On July 29, 2021, Scarlett Johansson filed a lawsuit93 against Disney over
its decision to stream Black Widow on Disney+ simultaneously with the
theatrical release.94 Marvel95 and Johansson entered an agreement dated as
of May 9, 2017, and executed in 2019, for Johansson to star in the movie
Black Widow.96 Johansson’s complaint claimed that the contract stated that
the release of Black Widow would be a “wide theatrical release of the Picture
(i.e., no less than 1,500 screens)” and that at the time of the agreement it was
well understood by the parties that a “theatrical release” referred to an
exclusive release in theaters for an extended period of time that was roughly
90–120 days.97 Her claims essentially hinged on the definition of “theatrical
release,” a term which was not defined in the contract during the process of
negotiation.98
Disney claimed that there was no breach of contract, as the agreement only
required that the theatrical release be on 1500 screens and as the movie was
ultimately released on over 30,000 screens worldwide.99 Disney’s response
claimed that “[t]he hybrid release pattern was the best thing for [Black
Widow] and all of the valued talent who contributed to its production,
especially given the continued uncertainty in the theatrical market and
unprecedented circumstances of the pandemic.”100 While Johansson’s
complaint emphasized the purported industry standard at the time of contract
formation,101 Disney’s response stressed the unique circumstances of the
pandemic that led to Black Widow’s simultaneous streaming and theatrical
release.102
As noted, Johansson’s agreement is dated May 9, 2017,103 long before
anyone would have known of the effects of a global pandemic on the contract
93. Complaint, Periwinkle Ent., Inc., f/s/o Scarlett Johansson v. The Walt Disney Co., No.
21STCV27831 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 29, 2021). Johansson and Disney reached a settlement
on September 30, 2021. Terms of the settlement were not disclosed. See Brooks Barnes,
Scarlett Johansson and Disney Settle Suit over ‘Black Widow’ Pay, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 30, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/30/business/scarlett-johansson-disneyblack-widow.html [https://perma.cc/55JE-3WAH]. The parties settled without reaching the
merits, so the issue presented remains an open question.
94. See Flint & Schwartzel, supra note 19.
95. Marvel Entertainment LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of The Walt Disney
Company. Marvel Corporate Information, MARVEL, https://www.marvel.com/corporate/
about [https://perma.cc/N2SE-8GX7] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022).
96. Defendant’s Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Court
Proceedings at 7, Periwinkle Ent., Inc., f/s/o Scarlett Johansson v. The Walt Disney Co., No.
21STCV27831 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2021) [hereinafter Defendant’s Motion].
97. Complaint, supra note 93, at 8; see id. at 3 (“This roughly 90–120 day theatrical
‘window’ was . . . industry-standard at the time the Agreement was finalized . . . .”).
98. See Julius Young, Disney’s ‘Black Widow’ Settlement with Scarlett Johansson
Protected a ‘Seismic Shift’ in Hollywood:
Expert, FOX BUS. (Oct. 11, 2021),
https://www.foxbusiness.com/lifestyle/disney-black-widow-settlement-scarlett-johanssonseismic-shift-hollywood-expert [https://perma.cc/6ZMM-75YF].
99. Defendant’s Motion, supra note 96, at 9.
100. Id.
101. See generally Complaint, supra note 93.
102. Defendant’s Motion, supra note 96, at 9.
103. The agreement date is when the obligations of the parties outlined in the contract
begin. While Johansson’s agreement was not executed until 2019, the parties’ obligations to
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in question. At the time of formation, Disney+ had not been released or even
announced yet,104 and few, if any, feature films in the industry had been
released simultaneously in theaters and on streaming platforms.105 This
points to a seemingly reasonable inference that neither Johansson nor Disney
would have anticipated that the term “theatrical release” would be disputed
during the course of the contract. Yet by the time Black Widow was set for
release, the industry had experienced major upheavals due to the
pandemic.106 Disney attempted to adapt by creating “Disney+ Premiere
Access,” a premium release strategy designed to ensure people could still
access major new releases in areas with closed movie theaters.107 The films
were released to Disney+ in most markets on the same day as their theatrical
releases.108 Prior to the release of Black Widow, Disney had used Disney+
Premiere Access to release three feature films.109
NBCUniversal called early premium video on-demand its “new normal”
and launched Peacock, its streaming service, during the pandemic.110
Industry experts seem to believe that this may be a permanent shift,
estimating that more studios will launch films simultaneously in theaters and
on streaming services—or via streaming alone.111 Some believe that while
the industry expects some kind of a return to pre-COVID-19 norms,
consumption patterns and consumer habits learned during the pandemic will
become embedded and may affect how the industry chooses to release films
post-pandemic.112

each other began at the agreement date, and the meaning the parties attached to the terms of
the agreement would therefore center on the date on which the contractual obligations began.
104. See Todd Spangler, Disney+ to Launch in November, Priced at $6.99 Monthly,
VARIETY (Apr. 11, 2019, 4:59 PM), https://variety.com/2019/digital/news/disney-plusstreaming-launch-date-pricing-1203187007/ [https://perma.cc/WU92-JRW7] (“Disney+ will
launch in the U.S. on Nov. 12, 2019 . . . . The company announced the pricing, launch date,
and other details Thursday at Disney’s 2019 Investor Day in Burbank, Calif.”); Disney
Investor
Day
2019,
THE
WALT
DISNEY
CO.
(Apr.
11,
2019),
https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/the-walt-disney-companys-2019-investor-day-webcast/
[https://perma.cc/SE63-MDMV]; see also Complaint, supra note 93, at 3.
105. See Chris Lee, Coronavirus Is Pushing Movies Out of Theaters and Online Faster
than Ever Before, VULTURE (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.vulture.com/2020/03/coronavirusis-pushing-movies-online-faster-than-ever-before.html
[https://perma.cc/KEA9-SR94]
(“After years of studios resisting the efforts of streaming giants such as Amazon and Netflix
to release their movies ‘day and date’—online and in theaters at the same time—the global
viral scare has finally persuaded Disney and Universal Pictures to dramatically close the
first-run gap.”).
106. See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text.
107. See Brandon Katz, Don’t Worry ‘Mulan’ Fans, Disney+ Premiere Access Is Not as
Confusing as You Think, OBSERVER (Aug. 18, 2020, 9:54 AM), https://observer.com/
2020/08/disney-plus-premier-access-explained-mulan/ [https://perma.cc/RXM9-M4VQ].
108. See id.
109. See Rubin, supra note 90.
110. See Faughnder, supra note 84.
111. See Richards, supra note 85.
112. See Jatinder Sidhu, 4 Things to Know About the Future of Media and Entertainment,
WORLD ECON. F. (Aug. 17, 2021), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/08/4-things-toknow-about-the-future-of-media-and-entertainment/ [https://perma.cc/BEX4-TUWL].
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b. Bargained-For Contracts in General
Johansson’s Black Widow contract was negotiated over the course of
several years113 and was not the first instance in which Johansson and Marvel
had entered into an agreement.114
While the exact details of Johansson’s previous agreements with Marvel
are not publicly available, the course of dealings between the parties could
be informative as to the parties’ intent in drafting the Black Widow
contract.115 In cases in which parties continually enter into agreements with
each other and the series of contracts are substantially the same, the party
arguing for an ex ante interpretation of the contract language could point to
the course of dealings116 to claim that the consistency of language used in the
contracts demonstrates understanding of the language by which the parties
intended to be bound.117
On the other hand, the party arguing for an ex post interpretation of the
disputed term could claim that the use of consistent terminology in a series
of long-term contracts could be intended to provide a flexible standard, which
could save costs of specification.118 When multiple long-term contracts have
been agreed upon and performed and the possibility remains for additional
future contracts of a similar nature to be drafted, it may be reasonable to
believe that the parties could know of potential disruptions that could affect
the course of one contract’s performance.119 Moreover, when parties are
113. The contract at issue was dated as of May 9, 2017, and executed in 2019 “after years
of extensive negotiation” in which Johansson was represented by “highly sophisticated
entertainment lawyers and agents who had negotiated hundreds of motion-picture
agreements.” Defendant’s Motion, supra note 96, at 7.
114. Johansson first portrayed the character “Black Widow” in 2010 and went on to reprise
that role in six more films prior to Black Widow. See Complaint, supra note 93, at 3.
115. See Ottinger, supra note 27, at 780–81 (“Courts consider that one of the best ways to
determine what parties intended in a contract is to examine the method in which the contract
was performed, particularly if performance has been consistent for a period of many years.
The manner in which parties have construed and thereby administered their own contract will
be given weight by the court which is later called upon to resolve a contractual dispute between
the parties.”).
116. “A ‘course of dealing’ is a sequence of conduct concerning previous transactions
between the parties to a particular transaction that is fairly to be regarded as establishing a
common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct.” U.C.C.
§ 1-303(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
117. See, e.g., Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 644 F.2d 772, 779 (9th Cir.
1981); see also U.C.C. § 1-303(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021) (“A course of
performance or course of dealing between the parties . . . is relevant in ascertaining the
meaning of the parties’ agreement, may give particular meaning to specific terms of the
agreement, and may supplement or qualify the terms of the agreement.”).
118. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 289, 289 (2006) (“To explain why parties write such incomplete contracts, it is
frequently suggested that many eventualities are hard to anticipate or describe in advance and
that leaving out details saves time and effort.”).
119. See Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis
Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1, 5–6 n.28 (“Professor Palay has suggested
that parties with ‘strong relational ties’ do not worry about a contract’s initial terms. Instead,
they assume that the contract will be adjusted in light of changed circumstances.”); id. (“Since
the costs of drafting, monitoring, and enforcing a once-and-for-all agreement outweigh the
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continuously engaged in the industry and generally aware of technological
advances that members of the industry would reasonably believe could
eventually affect terms of their agreements, defendants could argue that the
choice to not update the specific language and to instead rely on an
industry-standard interpretation in negotiations demonstrates the intent to
allow for judicial discretion in interpreting the language if the industry
standard does in fact shift during the course of performance.120
Similar situations have been addressed by courts in the past in cases such
as Oglebay Norton Co. v. Armco, Inc.,121 in which the parties entered into a
long-term contract for the shipment of iron ore.122 The parties established a
shipping rate based on a specific rate that was published in an industry
magazine and that usually represented the price that a leading iron ore shipper
charged for a similar service.123 Nearly thirty years after the contract was
executed, the contract pricing mechanisms failed, and Armco claimed the
contract was no longer enforceable because the contract had failed to meet
its purpose due to the complete breakdown of the rate-pricing
mechanisms.124 However, the evidence demonstrated a long-standing and
close business relationship between the parties; the evidence further showed
that the parties “contractually recognized Armco’s vital and unique interest
in the combined dedication of Oglebay’s bulk vessel fleet, and the parties
recognized that Oglebay could be required to ship up to 7.1 million gross tons
of Armco iron ore per year.”125 Therefore, the court found that the parties
intended to be bound by the terms of the contract despite the failure of its
pricing mechanisms.126
Based on the parties’ course of dealings and prior precedent regarding
long-term contracts, a party seeking an ex post interpretation of the contract
term may point to the relationship between the parties.127 That party may
then claim that, at the time of contracting, each party had a reasonable
expectation that the other would act consistently with its interests by being
flexible and cooperating to preserve the relationship if and when the
circumstances surrounding the agreement at or after the time of contracting
were changed.128

benefits, it is far more efficient to cross bridges as they are reached.” (citing Thomas M. Palay,
A Contract Does Not a Contract Make, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 561, 562)).
120. See Shavell, supra note 118, at 311 (“[S]ince the parties do not bear the costs to the
court of engaging in interpretation, the parties might specify socially excessive interpretation
to the degree that they can control the amount of interpretation.”); see also Hanoch Dagan &
Ohad Somech, When Contract’s Basic Assumptions Fail, CAN. J.L. & JURIS. (forthcoming
2021) (manuscript at 9) (“Parties, to be sure, may deliberately choose to have some risks
allocated ex-post.”).
121. 556 N.E.2d 515 (Ohio 1990).
122. See generally id.
123. Id. at 518.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 519.
126. Id. at 521.
127. See Hillman, supra note 119, at 7.
128. See id.
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2. Contracts of Adhesion
This section explores contracts of adhesion under which one party will
have little to no bargaining power and will enter a contract entirely drafted
by the other party. Part II.A.2.a looks specifically at recent higher education
contract disputes between students and universities. The pandemic shut
down in-person learning during the 2020 spring semester, and many students
claimed that the refusal by universities to partially refund tuition for the
semester constituted a breach of their contracts with the universities, as the
students claimed the agreements provided for in-person education.129 Part
II.A.2.b then addresses contracts of adhesion in general and reasons that the
shorter time frame of many contracts of adhesion—compounded with the
lack of negotiating power by one party to the agreement—could demonstrate
that the parties had no intention to allow for the updating of industry
standards within the term of the contract.
a. Higher Education: In-Person Tuition and Fees for Remote Learning
When universities were forced to move to remote learning to abide by
stay-at-home orders in March 2020, many students felt that they were
deprived of the in-person education for which they had paid.130 Students
claimed that they contracted for an in-person education based on an
expectation that the universities would provide an education consistent with
the general understanding of an in-person semester.131
Universities refused to partially refund tuition to the students, which led to
a series of lawsuits in which students claimed that there was a breach of
contract based on their belief that payment of their full tuition was intended
to contract for the expected full semester of in-person education.132 The
universities argued that the pandemic forced a shift to remote learning across
the higher-education industry and that the education they provided was
consistent with the in-person education for which the students had paid.133
Some courts have determined that it is not unreasonable to employ a
standard of reasonable expectation and to give a contract the meaning that
the party making the manifestation (the university) should reasonably expect
the other party (the student) to give it.134 While some courts have found that
129. See infra Part II.A.2.a.
130. See, e.g., In re Boston University COVID-19 Refund Litig., 511 F. Supp. 3d 20
(D. Mass. 2021); In re Columbia Tuition Refund Action v. Pace Univ., 523 F. Supp. 3d 414
(S.D.N.Y. 2021); Barkhordar v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 544 F. Supp. 3d 203
(D. Mass. 2021).
131. See supra note 130 and accompanying text; Rosado v. Barry Univ. Inc., 499 F. Supp.
3d 1152, 1157 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (“The Court agrees with Rosado that there is sufficient factual
content alleged in the Amended Complaint to establish the existence of a valid contract with
respect to in-person education.”); see also Metzner v. Quinnipiac Univ., 528 F. Supp. 3d 15,
22 (D. Conn. 2021) (“According to Plaintiffs, Quinnipiac’s default or customary mode of
educational delivery is to provide in-person instruction . . . .”).
132. See supra notes 130–31.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., In re Boston University COVID-19 Refund Litig., 511 F. Supp. 3d at 24.
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the students were unable to identify a specific contractual promise to provide
in-person educational instruction in exchange for students’ tuition and
fees,135 others have held that students were able to adequately allege the
existence of an agreement between the parties for an in-person experience
for the entire spring 2020 semester.136 Additionally, many disputes still have
not been decided, and additional court decisions about interpreting these
education contracts would provide more clarity about how an industry
adapting to the COVID-19 pandemic will affect contract interpretation
during the performance of the contract.137
b. Contracts of Adhesion in General
The agreements between universities and students illustrate a different
form of contracts than the bargained-for agreements used in the
entertainment industry. A contract of adhesion describes a standard-form
contract prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position,
with the weaker party having little to no choice about the terms.138 Courts
have largely recognized a contractual relationship between students and their
universities,139 and the drafting of the agreement is generally at the full
discretion of the university.140 The contract terms that govern the agreement
are generally determined based on “the school’s handbooks, policy manuals,
brochures and other promotional materials.”141 Courts interpreting these
terms are to employ the standard of reasonable expectation, which is the
meaning the university, as the party making the manifestation, should
reasonably expect the student to give it.142
Parties could argue that because expectations are driven entirely by the
prevailing practice, the understanding is that the university will conform to

135. See, e.g., Fedele v. Marist Coll., No. 20 CV 3559, 2021 WL 3540432, at *4–6
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2021).
136. See, e.g., Durbeck v. Suffolk Univ., 547 F. Supp. 3d 133, 146 (D. Mass. 2021).
137. See Salerno v. Fla. S. Coll., 488 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1214 (M.D. Fla. 2020) (holding
plaintiff adequately pled a breach-of-contract claim and denying motion to dismiss); see also
id. (“This case is novel in the sense that there is no legal precedent in involving a pandemic’s
impact on a school’s promise to provide in-person learning when doing so would be unsafe
and/or against government mandates. And so, like the ripple in a pond after one throws a
stone, the legal system is now feeling COVID-19’s havoc with the current wave of class action
lawsuits that seek tuition reimbursement related to forced online tutelage.”).
138. See Contract, supra note 81.
139. See, e.g., DMP v. Fay Sch. ex rel. Bd. of Trs., 933 F. Supp. 2d 214, 223 (D. Mass.
2013) (“Massachusetts law has long recognized that in the context of private education, there
is a contractual relationship between the school and the student.”); Zumbrun v. Univ. of S.
Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504 (Ct. App. 1972) (“The basic legal relation between a student and
a private university or college is contractual in nature.”); Wickstrom v. N. Idaho Coll., 725
P.2d 155, 157 (Idaho 1986) (“It is by now well-settled that the principal relationship between
a college and its students is contractual.”).
140. See Jonathan Flagg Buchter, Contract Law and the Student-University Relationship,
48 IND. L.J. 253, 265 (1973) (“[S]ince the institution maintains exclusive control over the
drafting of the contract terms, the logic applied to contracts of adhesion could be employed.”).
141. See Omori v. Brandeis Univ., 533 F. Supp. 3d 49, 54–55 (D. Mass. 2021).
142. See Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 735 N.E.2d 373, 378 (Mass. 2000).
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that prevailing industry practice.143 In contracts of adhesion, it seems less
plausible that the parties intended the standards to change over time, as the
student party’s decision to contract is based on what the student knows at the
time of contracting and what the students reasonably expects are the terms of
the agreement.144 Without a showing to the contrary, it may be unlikely that
both parties contemplated that the prevailing industry standard would change
over the course of performance and that a university would be responsible
for changing performance within the limited life of the contract.
In viewing education contracts and other contracts of adhesion, courts
generally construe ambiguous terms of the contract against the party who
wrote the terms, reasoning that the drafter’s advantage in unilaterally drafting
the contract should have resulted in clear expressions of the drafter’s
intent.145 Where the student, as the party lacking bargaining power, claims
a reasonable understanding of the ex ante industry standard of an in-person
education, a court more likely would apply that interpretation in enforcing
the agreement.146 Seeking an ex post interpretation of a shifting industry
standard against the party without the drafting power would likely create
further inequalities; the party that was unable to specify the exact terms of
the agreement in the first place would be required to perform a contract that
it did not expect to perform.147
Contracts in higher education also differ from entertainment contracts in
terms of the length of time in which the parties are involved in the
agreement,148 which could be relevant in determining the most reasonable
interpretation of a contract term. Unlike in cases of bargained-for contracts
that are negotiated over, and last for, a period of several years,149 students
typically have a limited period of time in which they may accept the terms of
the agreement.150 Students also rarely have any power to negotiate with the
university and must accept the terms as drafted in order to attend.151 The
period of time in which the parties are bound by the contract is also typically
shorter than that of an entertainment contract, as students typically agree to
be bound to the contractual relationship when they enroll and pay tuition,

143. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
144. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
145. See Buchter, supra note 140, at 264; see also Ottinger, supra note 27, at 787–88.
146. See Curtis J. Berger & Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process
for the University Student, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 289, 292 (1999).
147. See Ethan J. Leib & Steve Thel, Contra Proferentem and the Role of the Jury in
Contract Interpretation, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 773, 780–82 (2015).
148. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
150. Once a university extends an offer to a student, the student ordinarily has a deadline
before which they must commit to attending the university, typically with the submission of
an online form or letter of intent and a tuition deposit. See Justin Berkman, College Decision
Day: How to Notify Colleges, PREPSCHOLAR: ONLINE SAT/ACT PREP BLOG (Dec. 18, 2015,
7:00 PM), https://blog.prepscholar.com/college-decision-day [https://perma.cc/Z2CXZLPA].
151. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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which binds the parties for the semester or academic year.152 The contracts
between students and universities can be characterized as short-term
contracts that are shorter than the likely term of their relationship.153
The shorter fixed time frames in which the parties are involved prior to
executing the contract and the limited period in which the parties intend to
be bound by the agreement could point toward a reasonable presumption that
neither party intended to allow for updated industry standards to alter the
meaning of the contract.154 By applying a court-determined interpretation of
a contract term, which neither party intended at the formation of the contract,
courts could risk threatening freedom of contract and could produce
uncertainties for future contracts.155 On the other hand, in long-term
bargained-for contracts, a presumption that the parties negotiated and
planned for a specific promise and therefore assumed the risk of changing
circumstances often exists.156
B. Taking a Look at Contract Language
While the type of contract that the parties entered into is informative of
how the industry standard would be interpreted, the fundamental rule that
contract interpretation generally begins with the plain language of the
contract remains.157 Parties may incorporate industry standards into the
agreement in several ways. For example, contract language may explicitly
reference an industry standard, include a term that a party purports to be a
substantive standard, or incorporate the standard by default without any
reference to it.158 The language that the parties choose to include in the
contract could be viewed as a determining factor for how a court should
interpret the contract based on industry standards. This section looks at
examples of contract language that could provide for different interpretations
of industry standards.
1. Actual References to Industry Standards
In drafting a contract, parties sometimes choose to explicitly reference
industry standards to define an average rate for the particular service or good,
152. See generally K.B. Melear, The Contractual Relationship Between Student and
Institution: Disciplinary, Academic and Consumer Contexts, 30 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 175
(2003); see also Paynter v. N.Y. Univ., 319 N.Y.S.2d 893, 894 (App. Term 1971) (“[A]
student contracts with a college or university for a number of courses to be given during the
academic year.”).
153. See Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka & Oliver Hart, Short-term, Long-term, and
Continuing Contracts 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 21005, 2015)
(describing short-term contracts as those that are shorter than the likely term of their
relationship). Since students enter their contracts at each tuition payment for a time frame of
typically one academic year or semester, each short-term contract is shorter than the
anticipated multiyear student university relationship. See id.
154. See Hillman, supra note 119, at 2–3.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 202 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
158. See infra Part II.B.
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the quality of workmanship, or the way in which the parties will fulfill their
contractual obligations.159 In Oglebay, the parties agreed to set their rates
based on an industry standard, and the contract language indicated clear
intent to be bound to that standard regardless of changes during the life of the
contract.160 The court found that the parties intended to be bound by those
explicitly stated standards and that, upon the failure of the contract pricing
mechanisms, the price would be the reasonable price at the time of delivery
if the price is to be fixed based on an agreed upon market or other standard.161
Parties may also choose to reference industry standards by using terms
such as “commercially reasonable efforts,” “best efforts,” and other similar
standards.162 In these cases, courts frequently apply a reasonableness test,
which will often be based on the particular facts and circumstances of the
situation presented.163
Courts may look to external standards or
circumstances and need not limit themselves to the express terms of the
contract to define these industry standards.164 Based on a court’s application
and interpretation of these explicit industry standards, it appears more likely
that where parties explicitly reference industry standards in the agreement,
the parties intended to be bound to the industry standard regardless of
industry shifts during the course of the agreement.
2. Substantive Standards Interpreted as Industry Standards
In other contracts, parties may claim that the interpretation of industry
standards should be applied even where the existing language may seem to
state a substantive standard. In the Black Widow case, Johansson argued that
the term “wide theatrical release” included in the contract was understood
throughout the industry to refer to an industry standard that required an
exclusive theatrical release.165 While “wide theatrical release” was specified
in the agreement as “no less than 1,500 screens,” which could seem to state
a substantive standard, Johansson claimed that this happened to be an
industry standard.166
A court could read a substantive standard as being a clear and explicit
contract term; a court may further deem such term unambiguous.167 On the
other hand, claiming that a term should be interpreted according to industry
159. What Is the Relevance of “Industry Standards” Under the Law?, HG.ORG LEGAL RES.,
https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/what-is-the-relevance-of-industry-standards-under-thelaw-36794 [https://perma.cc/DQW3-YEEA] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022).
160. Oglebay Norton Co. v. Armco, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 515, 519 (Ohio 1990).
161. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 33 cmt. E (AM. L. INST. 1981)).
162. See Best Efforts, Commercially Reasonable Efforts, and Reasonable Efforts
Provisions
in
Commercial
Contracts,
LEXISNEXIS
(May
23,
2019),
https://www.lexisnexis.com/supp/largelaw/no-index/coronavirus/commercialtransactions/commercial-transactions-best-efforts-commercially-reasonable-efforts-andreasonable-efforts-provisions-in-commercial-contacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WE8-XS3H].
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
167. See supra Part I.A.2.
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standards could allow a party to claim that the contract term is ambiguous,
which would lead a court to apply rules of contract interpretation to
determine the meaning of the term.168 However, when unambiguous contract
language exists, courts usually interpret the words of the contract according
to their common and generally accepted meaning if the contract does not
otherwise specify.169 If parties claim in litigation that an industry standard
replaces a substantive standard that they had negotiated for, it could appear
that they are claiming an industry standard to avoid enforcement of the literal
term. This would likely run counter to the purpose of contract
interpretation.170 Consequently, where a substantive standard exists and is
defined in the contract, it seems unlikely that a court would choose to apply
an industry standard that contradicts the contract’s plain language.171
3. Industry Standards Incorporated by Default
While some contracts include explicit language referring to industry
standards and others include substantive language that a party then claims
embodies an industry standard, some do not include any language
referencing the industry standards by which the contract will be performed.
In these cases, in which industry standards are applied in interpretation, a
party may claim that the standards were incorporated by default.172
Contracts between students and universities are likely examples of such
agreements. In the cases addressed previously, students did not claim that
the agreement they entered into with the school explicitly referenced an
industry standard or that other specific language in the contract could be
purported to be an industry standard.173 As one court has noted, these
education contracts are “often set forth in a combination of the school’s
handbooks, policy manuals, brochures and other promotional materials.”174
It is possible that where neither party includes reference to industry
standards or even substantive language that could be purported to point to
industry standards, demonstrated intent to be bound by industry standards
possibly may not exist.175 Where the parties are not aware of the usage of
industry standards or are not familiar and involved in the industry, courts may
be less inclined to enforce an industry standard interpretation.176 However,
in cases in which the party wholly responsible for drafting a contract of
adhesion is aware of the industry standards and is engaged in the relevant
industry, the other party to the agreement could claim that the acceptance of

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See supra Part I.A.2.
See Storino, Ramello & Durkin v. Rackow, 45 N.E.3d 307, 313 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
See supra Part I.A.
See supra notes 25–32 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 173–74.
See supra Part II.A.2.i.
See Omori v. Brandeis Univ., 533 F. Supp. 3d 49, 54–55 (D. Mass. 2021).
See supra Part I.A.3.
See U.C.C. § 1-303(g) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
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the terms was based in part on an understanding that the industry standard
was incorporated by default.177
It seems unlikely that there can be an overarching resolution based on the
form the industry standard takes in the contract language or even the type of
contract. The multiple possibilities presented appear to show the necessity
of reviewing all aspects of the contract to determine a reasonable
interpretation of an industry standard and if or why it should be incorporated.
III. LOOKING FORWARD: A UNIFORM APPROACH
While industry shifts can change the understanding of an industry
standard, the potential implications of applying an ex post standard give
reason to support general enforcement of the ex ante interpretation of the
contract terms. Rapid shifts within an industry, such as those addressed in
this Note, are often unexpected and are often the product of necessity.178
Parties and courts can almost never be certain as to the timing of the shift—
how long the shift will last, whether the industry will revert to the ex ante
standard, or if the standard will shift yet again.179 This raises uncertainties
regarding both the point at which the industry standard should be fixed and
how to universally apply this interpretation standard.180
While an ex ante interpretation of a contract term promotes certainty in
application, that interpretation still may disproportionately prejudice one
party.181 This raises questions as to which party should bear the burden of
performing to meet an ex ante standard when the industry dictates a different
standard.182 Additionally, where industries shift specifically due to a matter
of public health, such as a pandemic, additional public health implications of
performing to meet the ex ante standard may arise.183 However, these
situations are highly case-specific and may be better suited for applications
of the doctrines of impossibility or impracticability and wherein a general
application of an ex ante standard may be unreasonable.
This part also addresses how the issues discussed in this Note may be
applied outside the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. While industries are
learning to adapt and attempting to settle into the new normal created by the
COVID-19 pandemic,184 the pandemic is likely not the last industry-shifting
event we will encounter in the near future.185 Based on existing research, it
appears that industry-shifting events will be more prevalent in the future due
to both rapid technological advancements and expected future pandemics,

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See supra Part II.A.2.b.
See, e.g., supra Parts II.A.1.a, II.A.2.a.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.B.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.C.
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and similar issues of contract interpretation could arise in light of these
events.186
A. Timing
In situations like the COVID-19 pandemic, in which an industry is forced
to shift seemingly overnight, it is unknown how long the shift will last and
whether that shift will be permanent.187 While industry experts may look to
earlier trends to speculate as to the permanence of the change,188 it is just as
possible that the industry shift will be temporary. While some experts believe
that the entertainment industry is inevitably headed toward a more permanent
shift to streaming services even post-pandemic,189 there is some indication
that a slight return to normal may precede any sort of permanent change.190
On the other hand, universities and colleges have already resumed in-person
education, with less indication that education will be forced toward a
permanent shift of the overall industry standard.191
When an industry has experienced an expected shift at a greatly
accelerated pace, it is also possible that the industry could settle at a middle
ground between the ex ante and ex post industry standards once the initial
event subsides.192 Additionally, where an industry standard shifts and then
resolves to the original standard during the course of performance of a
contract or goes back as soon as the contract is completed, parties would have
to decide which point in the life of the contract would bind the relevant
industry-standard interpretation of the agreement. In each case, the moment
of adjudication would significantly affect how the courts would interpret the
contract term, and the standard could become arbitrary in application.
Without a point at which the standard is fixed, parties could face uncertainty
over what they are agreeing to by including industry standard terms, and they
may experience a loss of autonomy to contract. Due to these factors, this
Note contends that a fixed point at which the standard is interpreted is

186. See infra Part III.C.
187. See Alexander W. Bartik et al., The Impact of COVID-19 on Small Business Outcomes
and Expectations, 117 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 17,656, 17,662 (2020).
188. See id.
189. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
190. See Danny Dorling, When Will Life Return to Normal After the Pandemic?, THE
CONVERSATION (Dec. 2, 2021, 8:04 AM), https://theconversation.com/when-will-life-returnto-normal-after-the-pandemic-172726 [https://perma.cc/NQ8T-SRX9].
191. See Adam Weinberg, Opinion, 5 Ways COVID-19 Will Change Higher Education
Forever, and How Colleges Can Adapt, USA TODAY (Aug. 4, 2020, 11:27 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/08/04/how-covid-19-change-highereducation-long-term-column/5571095002/ [https://perma.cc/5TXA-LT58] (outlining five
ways in which higher education may feel the lasting effects of the pandemic, focusing on
student and parent sentiment toward value of education, access to remote instruction, and
potential growth of some universities’ brands).
192. See Janna Anderson et al., Experts Say the “New Normal” in 2025 Will Be Far More
Tech-Driven, Presenting More Big Challenges, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 18, 2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/02/18/experts-say-the-new-normal-in-2025-willbe-far-more-tech-driven-presenting-more-big-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/S4NN-BQFE].
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required to maintain a uniform approach to interpretation and for parties to
maintain their freedom to contract.
B. A Matter of Fairness and Public Health
While promoting an ex ante standard for the interpretation of contract
terms may address the issue of timing, it may raise additional public policy
issues. Generally, contract interpretation seeks to promote parties’ freedom
to contract, and courts are often reluctant to unilaterally reform a contract to
make it “better.”193 A court may therefore be more inclined to promote
situations in which both parties claim they are able to perform to meet the
terms of the contract, as a court often will only excuse performance in narrow
circumstances where the parties are fully unable to perform.194 However,
this section argues that, even when it is possible to perform to meet an
ex ante standard, it may not always be the most efficient solution.
Although it may be beneficial to promote contract enforcement, the
acceptance of an ex ante standard for interpretation could be prejudicial to
the party forced to perform to a standard that is, likely for valid reasons, not
currently held throughout the industry.195 This raises the question of which
party should bear the burden of having to perform to meet the standard at the
time of formation when the industry dictates a different standard. Often,
when circumstances surrounding a contract change and become adverse to a
party’s interest, the contract term is still enforced, as there is a presumption
that over the course of bargaining and negotiation the parties assumed that
risk.196 However, when the changing circumstance could not have
reasonably been anticipated by either party during the period of contract
formation, it may be untenable to argue that either party should have
reasonably assumed such risk.
In disputes such as entertainment contracts for theatrical releases, an
ex ante exclusive theatrical release standard—such as the standard Johansson
claimed in her case—could require producers to release a movie exclusively
in theaters while theaters were still closed, at limited capacity, or even open
but with reduced turnout.197 While Black Widow was seen as a box office
success nearing pre-pandemic levels,198 other films, especially releases not

193. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 329 (2022).
194. See Thomas J. Hall, Defenses of Impossibility of Performance and Frustration of
Purpose, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 2017 (“Courts apply the doctrine [of impossibility] narrowly . . . .
The related doctrine of frustration of purpose may apply more broadly, but only where it would
make little sense to perform on a contract because of an intervening event.”).
195. See infra notes 197–204 and accompanying text.
196. See Hillman, supra note 119, at 2.
197. See supra Part II.A.1.b; see also Jake Coyle, Who’s Going Back to the Movies?: So
Far, Not Everyone, AP NEWS (Nov. 11, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/coronaviruspandemic-entertainment-lifestyle-business-arts-and-entertainmenta4e505df1bcfff8717662721521f282a [https://perma.cc/UP9R-5V5Y].
198. See Scott Mendelson, Box Office: ‘Black Widow’ Is Either 2021’s Most Successful
Disappointment or Its Most Disappointing Success, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2021, 4:15 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottmendelson/2021/08/10/box-office-black-widow-marvel-
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based on existing intellectual property, would be more likely to experience
the heavy impact of the pandemic.199 In the case of entertainment contracts
under which the actor receives a fixed rate,200 the production company
performing to meet an ex ante standard would likely be disproportionately
impacted while the actor would feel essentially no impact. It may therefore
be unreasonable, even when it is possible, to enforce an ex ante standard,
where one party would be unduly burdened by the performance that the party
agreed to prior to the changed circumstances. On the other hand, an ex post
standard could be considered unreasonable when an actor’s pay is based
entirely on theatrical box office revenue and when the production company
is held to an ex post standard allowing for other sources of revenue for the
motion picture outside the theatrical release.
In cases of shifts in industry standards, one party is often more affected
than the other.201 One party may be more likely to reasonably expect altered
performance due to a history of negotiation or level of experience in the
industry.202 In the case of contracts of adhesion, a court may be more
inclined to apply the rule of contra proferentem, which says that ambiguous
language should be construed against the interests of the party that drafted
the language, regardless of whether that interpretation prejudices that party
more.203 In bargained-for contracts, courts may look at the history of
negotiation to determine whether one party may have more reason to intend
to be bound to an updated standard.204 These opposing hypothetical
situations indicate that interpretation requires a case-specific inquiry as to
whether performance would truly be unjustifiably prejudicial to one party
over the other. These situations also indicate that a general application may
be unreasonable. This Note reasons that when there is no clear determination
as to whether one party should reasonably bear the burden of shifted
standards, excusing the party from performing the contract may therefore be
more fitting than enforcement of an ex ante standard.
Additionally, potential public health effects of the enforcement of an
ex ante interpretation may exist, particularly in the case of a pandemic.205 In
cases of certain contracts, public policy implications at the point of
interpretation should be considered.206 When enforcement would be counter
to public health interests during the pandemic, courts have used interpretation

most-successful-disappointment-or-its-most-disappointing-success/ [https://perma.cc/B8VJGP8S].
199. See Coyle, supra note 197.
200. See generally Darlene C. Chisholm, Profit-Sharing Versus Fixed-Payment Contracts:
Evidence from the Motion Pictures Industry, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 169 (1997).
201. See supra Parts II.A.1.a, II.A.2.a.
202. See supra Part II.A.1.
203. See Leib & Thel, supra note 147.
204. See Browning Jeffries, Preliminary Negotiations or Binding Obligations?: A
Framework for Determining the Intent of the Parties, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2012–13).
205. See David A. Hoffman & Cathy Hwang, The Social Cost of Contract, 121 COLUM. L.
REV. 979, 1002–05 (2021).
206. See id.
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to skirt around certain contract provisions.207 Historically, during times of
widespread disease and health emergencies, courts still applied a general
public health exception to performance, even when a party’s performance
was clearly neither impossible nor impracticable.208 However, matters of
public health are likely addressed through doctrines that allow for a party to
be excused from contract performance because while courts may want to
enforce contracts as written,209 they are unlikely to do so when there are clear
public health implications to performance.210
C. Why Does This Matter?
While current contracts are still affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, a
common expectation of an eventual return to some form of normalcy
exists.211 The COVID-19 pandemic brought to the forefront issues of
prevailing industry standards and the time in which the standard is
binding,212 and these implications will likely apply to contract law well
beyond the specific events of this pandemic.
Advances in technology have made industries more volatile than ever
before,213 and as businesses attempt to keep up with these changes, long-term
contracts may end up seeming more ambiguous and facing more
uncertainties. Scholars have referred to a “Law of Accelerating Returns,”214
proposed by Ray Kurzweil, in which the rate of change in a wide variety of
evolutionary systems—including but not limited to technological growth—
tends to increase exponentially.215 Kurzweil claims that whenever a
technology encounters an obstruction a new technology will be invented to
allow us to overcome that obstacle.216 Technological changes and
advancements have caused substantial upheaval in the past, and society may
need to learn to adapt more quickly in response to changing technologies.217
The length of time between the implementation of fundamentally upending
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technologies has been decreasing exponentially,218 which may point toward
more rapid and frequent industry shifts.219 This could potentially lead to
increased disputes about contract interpretation in industries undergoing
change.
Aside from technological changes, there are also potential health-related
industry-upsetting events that can be expected in the near future.220 Research
suggests that future pandemic risks are significant and that the view that
COVID-19 is a “once in a lifetime” pandemic is not necessarily accurate.221
The frequency and severity of epidemics will likely increase as a result of
human activities and their impact on the environment.222 Therefore,
industries likely will be forced to experience rapid change and encounter
similar uncertainties as to how industry-standard contract terms may be best
applied. To avoid these uncertainties and inconsistencies in interpretation
and based on how courts historically interpret industry standard terms, this
Note proposes that the adoption of an ex ante industry standard is the
reasonable resolution to this issue.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, questions of
prevailing industry standards as applied to contracts are becoming
increasingly relevant in contract interpretation. These issues bring about
concerns of applicable timing, equity in contracting, and the degree to which
external industry-shifting factors should affect a party’s performance
obligations. Ultimately, these concerns will likely become more prevalent
and necessary to address as industries in the future are forced to shift once
again to accommodate novel developments. Given the current uncertainty—
about both the shift forced by the pandemic and the general application of
industry standards in contracts—a general application of an ex ante
interpretation offers a clearer and more consistent solution to these current
and future issues.
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